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PRIVACY AND CONSENT OVER TIME: THE ROLE OF
AGREEMENT IN FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
CHRISTINE JOLLS*
Like many legal systems around the world, the American system
protects the “right to privacy,” or, as Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis famously put it, the “right to be let alone.”1 Although
Warren and Brandeis’s formulation has profoundly influenced
privacy law, a moment of thought reveals that most of us do not
wish to be entirely “let alone.” An individual wholly surrounded by
a cocoon of solitude—for instance, the Russian mathematician who
declined the equivalent of a Nobel Prize because he preferred to
remain secluded in his mother’s St. Petersburg home—is a rarity
(and usually at least somewhat of an oddity).2 Although we do not
want our homes or property to be open for inspection at all times,
we usually want the police to be able to come in and take a look
when we have been victims of a burglary.
Because most people want to be “let alone” in some circum-
stances, but not entirely, the issue of consent to letting another
enter into one’s own sphere looms large in privacy law. As the late
philosopher Joel Feinberg put it, “The root idea ... of privacy is that
of a privileged territory or domain in which an individual person has
the exclusive authority of determining whether another may enter,
and if so, when and for how long .... Within this area, the individual
person is ... boss, sovereign, owner.”3 Privacy, far from referring to
* Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law, Yale Law School. George Wythe Lecture,
Mar. 21, 2012. I am grateful to Abbe Gluck, Neal Katyal, and Yale Law School Information
Society Project workshop participants for extremely helpful comments and to Matthew
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1.  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2. See Dennis Overbye, A Math Problem Solver Declines a $1 Million Prize, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2010, at A10.
3. 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 24 (1985).
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a sphere within which one is always “let alone,” refers to a sphere
in which we are allowed to determine who may enter, when, and
under what circumstances.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, pro-
tecting “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures,”4 guards against government privacy invasions, and, as with
other strands of privacy law, consent has long played a significant
role. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte,5 an individual’s voluntary agreement to a search
means that no Fourth Amendment violation has occurred;6 for in-
stance, if a government official comes to my front door or to my car
and asks if he or she may search my house or my car, and I say yes,
then going ahead and searching my house or my car is permitted
under the Fourth Amendment.7 Today, “there are few areas of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of greater practical significance
than consent searches.”8 Although in some cases agreement to a
search might be implied from the surrounding circumstances rather
than taking the express form seen in Schneckloth, the doctrine and
analysis in this Article focus on express agreement.9
That one’s agreement is relevant—often highly so—to privacy
analysis under the Fourth Amendment has been clear for decades.
However, as the Fourth Amendment has confronted various fea-
tures of modern life, significant fault lines around the role of agree-
ment have appeared. The focus of this Article is some of those fault
lines—and how we might go about beginning to repair them. 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
6. Id. at 219, 222-23.
7. See, e.g., id. at 219, 227-34.
8. 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 16.01, at 247 (5th ed. 2010).
9. Often, though not always, express agreement to a search is memorialized in a written
document. See, e.g., Nancy Leong & Kira Suyeishi, Consent Forms and Consent Formalism,
2013 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 17-30) (on file with author).
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I
Let us start with two canonical cases from the modern era. 
Case 1: Imagine that a public university’s employee handbook
specifies that employees may be subjected to random drug testing
at any time in furtherance of the university’s drug-free-campus
policy. Employees must sign a form their first day on the job indi-
cating that they will submit to such drug testing. Testing is done
through laboratory analysis of a urine sample, with the urine
sample being produced in the presence of a monitor to preclude the
possibility of adulteration of the sample. 
Has every university employee “consented to” producing a urine
sample in the presence of a monitor for purposes of drug testing by
virtue of the provision in the employee handbook? Does a Fourth
Amendment challenge therefore immediately fail on grounds of such
“consent”? 
Under current law, the answer is clearly “no”; courts do not rely
on consent in resolving Fourth Amendment challenges in drug
testing cases of the sort just described.10 Workplace drug testing
challenges under the Fourth Amendment began to rise to promi-
nence in the late 1980s with the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in National Federation of
Federal Employees v. Weinberger.11 “We hold,” wrote the Weinberger
court, “that a search otherwise unreasonable [under the Fourth
Amendment] cannot be redeemed by a public employer’s exaction of
a ‘consent’ to the search as a condition of employment.”12 
If the Fourth Amendment outcome is not determined by consent
in a case such as Weinberger, then how is that outcome determined?
Courts in such cases engage in a substantive balancing of two gen-
eral interests: the employee’s privacy interest in not performing “an
excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy”13 at the
request of, and with monitoring by, the employee’s public employer;
and the public employer’s interest in detecting and deterring illegal
10. See sources cited infra notes 11, 16.
11. 818 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
12. Id. at 943.
13. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989).
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drug use in service of “the efficient and proper operation of the
workplace.”14 The question of whether workplace drug testing vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment turns on the relative weight of these
two interests. Although “[a]dvance notice” of the workplace drug
testing “may be taken into account as one of the factors relevant to
the extent of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy” (the
first interest),15 the legal framework remains one of balancing of the
two substantive interests rather than a simple on-off switch of
“consent.”
The Weinberger court’s adoption of a substantive balancing test
in lieu of a consent-based approach to workplace drug testing is
reflected in other circuits’ case law as well.16 An opinion written by
Judge Wilkinson of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in 2000 is illustrative. Notwithstanding an em-
ployee’s signed drug testing agreement from his first day on the job,
Judge Wilkinson’s analysis of the employee’s subsequent challenge
to workplace drug testing focused not on the “consent” of the em-
ployee but rather on the importance of the government employer’s
interests in drug testing in relation to the employee’s privacy
interests.17 “[T]he permissibility of a particular [search] is judged by
balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental inter-
ests.”18 Judge Wilkinson proceeded to analyze the challenged work-
place drug testing on the basis of the strength of those interests
—not based on any notion of the employee’s “consent.”19
Consider now a second paradigmatic case of our era, involving
workplace computer surveillance.
Case 2: Materials gathered by a professor at a public university
for a book he is writing include hundreds of controversial images,
which he has stored on his computer hard drive. The university
faculty manual provides that university computers may be moni-
14. Weinberger, 818 F.2d at 942 (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987)). 
15. Id. at 943.
16. See, e.g., Carroll v. City of Westminster, 233 F.3d 208, 211 (4th Cir. 2000); Aubrey v.
Sch. Bd. of Lafayette Parish, 148 F.3d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1998); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d
1302, 1307-08 (8th Cir. 1987).
17. Carroll, 233 F.3d at 211.
18. Id. (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619).
19. Id.
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tored or scanned at any time. The professor signed a form the first
day on the job acknowledging receipt of the manual and the profes-
sor’s acceptance of its provisions. Nine years later, the professor
learns that his hard drive, with its controversial material, has
recently been comprehensively imaged by the university computer
services department. Did the professor, in signing the form pre-
sented to him on his first day on the job, “consent” to the compre-
hensive imaging, such that the imaging is automatically permissible
under the Fourth Amendment?
In today’s Fourth Amendment case law on computer surveillance,
we see some courts adopting the type of consent argument that was
squarely rejected in the drug testing context discussed above.
Interestingly, the most prominent of the rulings adopting consent
analysis in the context of computer surveillance was decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit within a few
months of the Judge Wilkinson opinion discussed above.
The Fourth Circuit surveillance case, United States v. Simons,20
arose from the imaging of an employee’s hard drive after the em-
ployee had come under suspicion of harboring child pornography
on his computer.21 The Fourth Circuit panel, not including Judge
Wilkinson, dismissed the employee’s Fourth Amendment challenge
to the computer surveillance on the ground that the employee did
not “assert that he was unaware of, or that he had not consented to,
the [workplace] Internet policy,” which allowed the employer to
“inspect, and/or monitor the user’s [computer].”22 The court held that
in light of the employee’s “consent,” there was no need to engage in
any balancing of his privacy interests versus the government’s inter-
ests in workplace efficiency and safety.23 Because of the employee’s
“consent,” the Fourth Amendment argument seemed to be over be-
fore it even really began.
In the years following Simons, several other cases have taken a
similar approach to computer surveillance. In United States v.
Thorn,24 for instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the
20. 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000).
21. Id. at 396.
22. Id. at 396, 398 n.8.
23. Id. at 398 & n.8.
24. 375 F.3d 679 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1112 (2005). 
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Eighth Circuit ruled against a government employee’s challenge to
workplace computer surveillance on the ground that the employee
“was fully aware of the computer-use policy, as evidenced by his
written acknowledgement of the limits imposed on his computer-
access rights,” including the provision that he had “no personal right
of privacy with respect to” his employer’s computers.25 Likewise, the
court in United States v. Gavegnano26 rejected a child pornography
defendant’s Fourth Amendment challenge to computer surveillance
on the ground that when he “was issued a government computer,
the user agreement he signed stated that he was aware of the ac-
ceptable use of all government-issued information systems, [and]
that he consented to the monitoring of the information systems.”27
The approach to computer surveillance adopted in Simons has not
been universally followed. For example, a 2007 opinion by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit following a
petition for rehearing of a 2006 case suggested an appreciation for
the far-reaching implications of Simons’s divergence from the ap-
proach in the drug testing cases discussed above.28 The 2007 opinion
withdrew the earlier opinion—an opinion that had unreservedly
applied Simons:
Upon their hiring, [the company’s] employees were apprised of
the company’s monitoring efforts through training and an
employment manual, and they were told that the computers
were company-owned and not to be used for activities of a
personal nature.... Like Simons, [the employee here] “does not
assert that he was unaware of, or that he had not consented to,
the Internet [and computer] policy.”29 
In the 2007 opinion, the Ninth Circuit, unequivocally eschewing any
reliance on this reasoning, instead emphasized the importance of
Ziegler’s privacy rights in the office within which the computer was
located:
25. Id. at 683.
26. 305 F. App’x 954 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
27. Id. at 955-56.
28. United States v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2007).
29. United States v. Ziegler, 456 F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 2006) (last alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 n.8 (4th Cir. 2000)), withdrawn
by Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184. 
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Ziegler’s expectation of privacy in his office was reasonable on
the facts of this case....
Had the company computer assigned to Ziegler ... been
physically located outside a private office, we might have had to
consider whether Ziegler had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the device itself, in the face of a corporate policy of monitoring
the corporate computers. However, we leave that question for
another day.30
To be sure, the facts giving rise to Ziegler’s Fourth Amendment
challenge provided, in the court’s view, an alternative ground on
which to rule against this challenge.31 Unlike Simons, Ziegler was
not a government employee, and thus the search was conducted not
by the government in its role as employer, but instead by the
government in its law enforcement capacity in cooperation with
Frontline Processing, Ziegler’s private employer.32 In these cir-
cumstances, wrote the court in the 2007 opinion, “the government
... may show that permission was obtained from a third party who
possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to
the premises or effects sought to be inspected.”33 In concluding that
Frontline “exercised common authority over the office and the work-
place computer such that it could validly” permit the government’s
search, the court relied on several factors, including Frontline’s
pervasive control over Ziegler’s company-owned computer and the
fact that employees “were apprised of the company’s monitoring” of
such computers34—just as the Weinberger court concluded that
advance notice of workplace drug testing could be “taken into
account as one of the factors relevant to the extent of the employees’
legitimate expectations of privacy.”35 Still, the Ninth Circuit clearly
30. Ziegler, 474 F.3d at 1190 & n.9 (internal citation omitted).
31. See id. at 1191-92.
32. Id. Several judges dissented from the denial of en banc review of the 2007 opinion on
the ground that, in these judges’ view, no valid agreement to the search by Ziegler’s employer
existed. See United States v. Ziegler, 497 F.3d 890, 895-99 (9th Cir. 2007) (W. Fletcher, J.,
dissenting from the denial of en banc review); id. at 900-01 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the
denial of en banc review).
33. Ziegler, 474 F.3d at 1191 (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. at 1191-92.
35. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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stepped back from the Simons-based consent analysis offered in the
opinion the court chose to withdraw.36
36. See Ziegler, 474 F.3d at 1185 (withdrawing previous opinion); supra text
accompanying note 30 (court’s reservation of question addressed in Simons). 
In the view of one of two Ninth Circuit opinions dissenting from the denial of en banc
review of the new ruling in Ziegler, “the only analysis provided to substantiate Frontline’s
authority to consent [was] a description of Frontline’s computer monitoring policy.” Ziegler,
497 F.3d at 896 (W. Fletcher, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc review) (citing Ziegler,
474 F.3d at 1191-92). However, the new ruling’s analysis of Frontline’s authority to consent
in fact seemed to rest heavily, although not exclusively, on Frontline’s ownership rights in
Ziegler’s workplace computer and various other factors suggesting Frontline’s “mutual access
and joint use,” id. at 896, of the computer:
Frontline could give valid consent to a search of the contents of the hard drive
of Ziegler’s workplace computer because the computer is the type of workplace
property that remains within the control of the employer “even if the employee
has placed personal items in [it].” In [O’Connor v.] Ortega, the Supreme Court
offered an analogy that is helpful to our resolution of this question. The Court
posited a situation where an employee brings a piece of personal luggage to work
and places it within his office. The Court noted that “[w]hile ... [whatever
expectation of privacy the employee has in] the outward appearance of the
luggage is affected by its presence in the workplace, the employee’s expectation
of privacy in the contents of the luggage is not affected in the same way.” The
Court further explained that “[t]he appropriate standard for a workplace search
does not necessarily apply to a piece of closed personal luggage, a handbag or a
briefcase that happens to be within the employer’s business address.”
The workplace computer, however, is quite different from the piece of personal
luggage which the Court described in Ortega. Although use of each Frontline
computer was subject to an individual log-in, ... IT-department employees “had
complete administrative access to anybody’s machine.” The company had also
installed a firewall, which ... is “a program that monitors Internet traffic ... from
within the organization to make sure nobody is visiting any sites that might be
unprofessional.” Monitoring was routine, and the IT department reviewed the
log created by the firewall “[o]n a regular basis,” sometimes daily if Internet
traffic was high enough to warrant it. Finally, upon their hiring, Frontline
employees were apprised of the company’s monitoring efforts through training
and an employment manual, and they were told that the computers were
company-owned and not to be used for activities of a personal nature.
In this context, Ziegler could not reasonably have expected that the computer
was his personal property, free from any type of control by his employer. The
contents of his hard drive ... were work-related items that contained business
information and which were provided to, or created by, the employee in the
context of the business relationship. Ziegler’s downloading of personal items to
the computer did not destroy the employer’s common authority. Thus, Frontline,
as the employer, could consent to a search of the office and the computer that it
provided to Ziegler for his work.
Ziegler, 474 F.3d at 1191-92 (first, third, fifth, and sixth alterations in original) (internal
citations and emphasis omitted). This treatment of Frontline’s authority to consent seems to
suggest that the company’s ownership of Ziegler’s workplace computer and much of its
content—and not merely the company’s “computer monitoring policy,” Ziegler, 497 F.3d at 896
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II
Viewed against the backdrop of the conventional role of consent
in Fourth Amendment doctrine, the workplace drug testing cases
discussed in Part I initially seem to present something of a puzzle.
In general, when an individual voluntarily agrees to a search, the
search is, for that reason, permissible under the Fourth Amend-
ment.37 Why, then, is a substantive balancing of interests needed in
cases in which employees agree at the time of hiring that they will
submit to drug testing at any point over the course of their term of
employment? 
One obvious answer is that agreement in such a case is not
“voluntary”; employees may well suffer dire consequences if they fail
to agree.38 Without in any way disputing the force of that argument,
this Part offers an additional, less familiar way to understand the
legal treatment of the sort of agreement discussed in the workplace
drug testing cases in Part I—a way that turns out to yield certain
distinctive implications, as discussed more fully in Part IV below. 
When an individual agrees to a law enforcement officer’s request
to search, agreement is typically virtually contemporaneous with the
search itself: there has been a knock on the door, someone is
standing there when I open the door, I give that person my permis-
sion to search, and the search happens. I am not asked to give my
general agreement to searches that might or might not occur at
undetermined points in the perhaps-distant future. The workplace
drug testing context is quite different. At the time a drug testing
agreement is signed, drug testing is often not imminent, and in fact
the odds that a given employee will ever be tested may be quite
small; drug testing—especially accurate drug testing—is expensive,
(W. Fletcher, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc review)—produced the conclusion that
Frontline had authority to consent to the government’s search. 
37. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 222-23 (1973).
38. Cf. Legal Issues Relating to the Testing, Use & Deployment of an Intrusion-Detection
Sys. (EINSTEIN 2.0) to Protect Unclassified Computer Networks in the Exec. Branch, 33 Op.
O.L.C. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Einstein], available at http://www.justice.gov/ olc/2009/e2-
issues.pdf, at *15 (“In the context of public employment, ... merely obtaining the consent of
an employee to search is not necessarily coextensive with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. Such consent must be voluntary and cannot be obtained through duress or
coercion.”).
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and in many workplaces it dampens employee morale and loyalty as
well.
The uncertainty in the second case, in contrast to the imminence
and certainty in the first case, is extremely important. It is much
easier to be confident in human judgment when the decision maker
is at the threshold of a decision—the situation is about to unfold,
right then and there, for sure—than it is to be confident in human
judgment when the decision maker confronts a hypothetical possi-
bility that might or might not occur down the road. The central task
of this Part will be to describe the basis for this distinction. Once the
importance of the distinction is appreciated, the gap between the
Simons approach—giving controlling force to in-advance agree-
ment—and mainstream doctrine under the Fourth Amendment
comes into focus.
For it is not only in the workplace drug testing context that courts
adjudicating Fourth Amendment challenges to government searches
have declined to draw an inference of consent from an in-advance
agreement. The Supreme Court pointedly avoided making such an
inference in United States v. Knights,39 which involved a Fourth
Amendment challenge to a probation agreement specifying that the
probationer could be searched “at anytime, with or without a search
warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause” throughout the
term of his probation.40 The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, declined to address the question on which certiorari had
been granted in the case: whether “agreement to a term of probation
that authorized any law enforcement officer to search [the pa-
rolee’s] person or premises with or without a warrant, and with or
without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, constituted a valid
consent.”41 “We need not decide,” the Chief Justice wrote, “whether
Knights’ acceptance of the search condition constituted consent
in the Schneckloth sense of a complete waiver of his Fourth
Amendment rights, however, because we conclude that the search
of Knights was reasonable”—reasonableness being the “touchstone
of the Fourth Amendment.”42 The reasonableness analysis, the
Court continued, requires “assessing, on the one hand, the degree
39. 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
40. Id. at 114.
41. Brief for the United States at I, Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (No. 00-1260).
42. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118.
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to which [a search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legiti-
mate governmental interests.”43 In this analysis, the probation
agreement was one “salient circumstance”44—much as the forms of
advance notice in Weinberger and Ziegler factored into the multi-
pronged Fourth Amendment analyses undertaken in those cases.45
Thus, despite the Department of Justice’s insistent contention in its
brief in Knights that an individual may “give valid and binding
prospective consent to a category of searches to be performed at un-
specified times in the future,”46 the Court—in the hands of a jurist
renowned for his deference to law enforcement views47—refused the
government’s invitation to adopt a Simons-type consent analysis.48
43. Id. at 118-19 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
44. Id. at 118. 
45. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
46. Brief for the United States, supra note 41, at 8. 
47. See, e.g., R. Ted Cruz, In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 HARV. L. REV. 10, 10
(2005).
48. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118. In the earlier case of Zap v. United States, the Court
appeared to give heavy weight to the fact that the defendant had agreed as a condition of
receiving a military contract from the government to permit inspection and audit at all times
of the corporate books at the defendant’s place of business. 328 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1946),
vacated on other grounds, 330 U.S. 800 (1947). The Department of Justice’s brief in Knights
relied prominently on Zap: 
Zap further establishes the proposition—central to this case—that a consent
to search may be granted in advance, and without specific restrictions. The
defendant in Zap did not give consent at the time the search was conducted; to
the contrary, he attempted (unsuccessfully) to prevent the search from
occurring. 328 U.S. at 627. The Court nevertheless found that the defendant was
bound by his prior contractual commitment to permit inspection of his books and
records. Zap makes clear that an individual may give valid and binding
prospective consent to a category of searches to be performed at unspecified
times in the future.
Brief for the United States, supra note 41, at 16-17. The Court’s eschewal of this reasoning in
Knights may suggest that something about the military contracting context, rather than a
general inference of Fourth Amendment consent from in-advance agreement, produced the
result in Zap. 
Prior to Knights, the Supreme Court decided a major Fourth Amendment case involving
drug testing in the government workplace, see Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989), but that case did not involve the sort of in-advance agreement discussed in
Part I because agreement to the drug testing in Von Raab was required only at the time of
transfer or promotion to specifically designated positions. Id. at 659, 663-64. Other Supreme
Court drug testing cases under the Fourth Amendment have involved such contexts as drug
testing of student-athletes, see Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), and gov-
ernment regulation requiring drug testing by private employers, see Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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Granting dispositive weight to in-advance agreement, as in
Simons, departs not only from mainstream Fourth Amendment doc-
trine but also from common law privacy doctrine. Under a long line
of common law cases, actions that “unreasonably intrude” on the
“seclusion” of another person are tortious even if the person has
given in-advance agreement to the actions, although they are not
tortious if the person has given contemporaneous agreement to
them.49 For instance, intrusion upon seclusion challenges to private-
sector workplace drug testing purportedly authorized by an in-
advance agreement are routinely resolved on the basis of sub-
stantive balancing of employees’ and employers’ interests (just as
under the Fourth Amendment)—not on the basis of the in-advance
agreement.50 Similarly, intrusion upon seclusion cases addressing
workplace computer surveillance either entirely eschew reliance on
in-advance computer monitoring policies51 or, at a minimum, avoid
the sort of blanket consent-based reasoning found in Simons.52
Long-standing common law precedent thus supports the approach
to in-advance agreement described in Part I’s discussion of Fourth
Amendment challenges to workplace drug testing—and is at odds
with Simons’s approach to in-advance agreement to surveillance of
workplace computers. 
Might it be sensible to have greater confidence in human
judgment when decision makers provide their contemporaneous
agreement than when they enter into an in-advance agreement
governing uncertain future behavior? A couple of interesting rea-
sons support such a distinction, but this Part focuses on one par-
ticularly important factor. Richard Thaler, a behavioral economist
at the University of Chicago, likes to offer the following account of
typical thinking about a future uncertain event or outcome:
Before the start of Thaler’s class in Managerial Decision
Making, students fill out an anonymous survey on the course
49. See Christine Jolls, Privacy, Consent, and Time 9-31 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
50. See, e.g., Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 13, 19-24 (N.J. 1992).
51. See Garrity v. John Hancock, No. CIV.A. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, at *1-2 (D.
Mass. May 7, 2002). 
52. See Jolls, supra note 49, at 33-34, 37 (discussing Kelleher v. City of Reading, No.
CIV.A.01-3386, 2002 WL 1067442 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2002), and Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, No.
CV-03-467-ST, 2004 WL 2066746 (D. Or. Sept. 15, 2004) (magistrate judge opinion)). 
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Web site. One of the questions is “In which decile do you expect
to fall in the distribution of grades in this class?” Students can
check the top 10 percent, the second 10 percent, and so forth.
Since these are MBA students, they are presumably well aware
that in any distribution, half the population will be in the top 50
percent .... And only 10 percent of the class can, in fact, end up
in the top decile.
...[T]he results of this survey reveal a high degree of unrealis-
tic optimism .... Typically less than 5 percent of the class expects
their performance to be [in the bottom 50 percent] and more
than half the class expects to perform in [the top 20 percent].53
The same phenomenon turns out to apply to professors: about “94
percent of professors at a large university were found to believe that
they are better than the average professor.”54
Just like most of the MBA students in Thaler’s class think they
will score much higher than average (even though, by brute
definition, the majority of the class cannot be above average), many
people confronting other types of uncertain life events tend to
assume that “it will be fine,” that it will be someone else who gets
divorced, fails to be promoted, dents another car in the parking
garage, or gets caught in a drug testing net at work.55 By contrast,
when someone is standing right in front of me and asks for my
agreement to a search of my house or my car, I cannot help but
realize that if I say yes, the search will happen. That critical
rationality-encouraging feature of certainty (and the immediacy
that is virtually a necessary condition for certainty) is absent when
agreement is sought to something that may or may not arise at
some point down the road.
The account of in-advance versus contemporaneous agreement
offered here implies that eschewing consent in cases of in-advance
agreement, as in the workplace drug testing cases discussed in
Part I, has much to recommend it. The contrary Simons approach
departs from mainstream Fourth Amendment doctrine, from long-
53. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 31-32 (2008).
54. Id. at 32.
55. Recent economics literature identifies a rigorous framework for identifying
optimistically biased perceptions in a population. See Jean-Pierre Benoit & Juan Dubra,
Apparent Overconfidence, 79 ECONOMETRICA 1591 (2011); Christoph Merkle & Martin Weber,
True Overconfidence: The Inability of Rational Information Processing to Account for Apparent
Overconfidence, 116 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 262 (2011).
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standing common law privacy case law, and from behavioral eco-
nomics analysis of in-advance versus contemporaneous agreement.
Of course, the reduced reliability of human judgment in an in-
advance agreement as opposed to a contemporaneous agreement
may not be the only important factor in determining the proper
legal treatment of an in-advance agreement under the Fourth
Amendment. In the Knights context of probation agreements, for
instance, the government contended that criminal defendants could
be significantly harmed by the failure to credit in-advance search
agreements because “trial judges might be less willing to offer
probation if they lacked assurance that the probationer’s compliance
with the conditions of release could be closely monitored.”56 If, in a
given context, the failure to credit in-advance agreements ran a
serious risk of greatly undercutting an entire category of transac-
tions (such as the granting of probation), then, despite the limits on
human judgment often associated with in-advance agreements,
crediting such agreements might make a good deal of sense. The
suggestion here is not that in-advance agreements are fatally
compromised in every conceivable context, just that the argument
for giving them effect in a case such as Simons is not to be found in
existing Supreme Court or common law doctrine and must rely on
factors weighty enough to overcome the limits on human judgment
typically associated with such agreements.
III
Despite the departure of the Simons approach from the precedent
and analysis described above, the Department of Justice has aggres-
sively deployed Simons in important controversies in recent years.
Both in a lengthy 2009 memorandum on computer surveillance of
United States government employees and in Supreme Court briefing
the following year, the Department of Justice treated in-advance
agreement and contemporaneous agreement as entirely inter-
changeable for Fourth Amendment purposes.
56. Brief for the United States, supra note 41, at 8.
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The Department of Justice’s “EINSTEIN” Memorandum
EINSTEIN is a United States computer surveillance system
designed to protect government network traffic from malicious ac-
tivity.57 EINSTEIN 1.0, which originated in 2004, involved monitor-
ing “packet header” material such as the information packet’s
source and destination Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and the date
and time of packet transmission.58 No examination of the content of
packets occurred under EINSTEIN 1.0.59
EINSTEIN 2.0, launched in 2008, added surveillance of content
information and, accordingly, raised Fourth Amendment issues that
were not in play with EINSTEIN 1.0.60 Courts have consistently
held that noncontent information associated with communications
technologies—information such as phone numbers dialed, IP ad-
dresses used, and date and time of the communication—does not
receive Fourth Amendment protection;61 by contrast, content infor-
mation has traditionally received a high level of Fourth Amendment
protection.62 
The year after EINSTEIN 2.0’s launch, the Department of Justice
released a lengthy memorandum analyzing the new computer sur-
veillance system under the Fourth Amendment.63 At the heart of the
Department of Justice’s reasoning about the status of EINSTEIN
2.0 was the assertion, repeatedly invoked in the Department of
Justice memorandum, that either a daily log-on banner requiring an
employee’s agreement in order to sign in each work day or a general
in-advance computer-use agreement of the sort in the Simons case
rendered EINSTEIN 2.0 permissible, on grounds of “consent,” under
the Fourth Amendment.64 The Department’s memorandum relied
57. Einstein, supra note 38, at *2-3. 
58. Id. at *2; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY COMPLIANCE REVIEW OF THE
EINSTEIN PROGRAM 2 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/
privacy_privcomrev_nppd_ein.pdf.
59. Einstein, supra note 38, at *2. 
60. Id. at *7-8; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 58, at 2.
61. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-45 (1979) (phone numbers); United
States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 504, 510-11 (9th Cir. 2008) (“packet header” material).
62. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-59 (1967) (content of telephone
conversation); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284-86, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (content
of e-mail messages).
63. See Einstein, supra note 38.
64. See, e.g., id. at *15 (“An Executive Branch employee who clicks ‘I agree’ in response
to the model log-on banner, enabling him to use Government-owned information systems to
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specifically on Simons—as well as on another case discussed in Part
I above, United States v. Thorn.65
access the Internet, or an employee who signs the model computer-user agreement, thereby
acknowledging his ‘consent[ ]’ to monitoring of his use of those systems, certainly appears to
have consented expressly to the scanning of his incoming and outgoing Internet
communications.” (alteration in original) (emphasis added)); see also id. at *1 (“An intrusion-
detection system known as EINSTEIN 2.0 used to protect civilian unclassified networks in
the Executive Branch against malicious network activity complies with the Fourth
Amendment ... provided that certain log-on banners or computer-user agreements are
consistently adopted, implemented, and enforced by executive departments and agencies
using the system.”); id. (“[A]s long as [entities] ... participating in EINSTEIN 2.0 operations
consistently adopt, implement, and enforce the model log-on banner or computer-user
agreement—or log-on banners or computer-user agreements with terms that are substantially
equivalent to those models—the use of EINSTEIN 2.0 technology to detect computer network
intrusions and exploitations against Federal Systems complies with the Fourth
Amendment.”); id. at *6 (“[T]he deployment, testing, and use of EINSTEIN 2.0 technology
complies with the Fourth Amendment where each EINSTEIN 2.0 Participant consistently
adopts and implements the model log-on banner or model computer-user agreement—or a log-
on banner or computer-user agreement containing substantially equivalent terms.”); id. at *9
(“[W]e believe that an ... employee will not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
content of his Internet communications transmitted over Government-owned information
systems, provided that EINSTEIN 2.0 Participants consistently adopt, implement, and
enforce appropriate consent and notification procedures, such as the model log-on banner or
model computer-user agreement.”); id. at *11 (“[W]e believe that an ... employee who has
clicked through the model log-on banner or signed the model computer-user agreement ...
would not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of Internet communications
made using Government-owned information systems and transmitted over Federal
Systems.”); id. at *21 (“[We] ... conclude that an Executive Branch employee’s agreement to
the terms of the model log-on banner or the model computer-user agreement, or those of a
banner or user agreement that are substantially equivalent to those models, constitutes valid,
voluntary consent to the reasonable scope of EINSTEIN 2.0 operations.”).
 Although the Department of Justice’s preferred line of argument appears to be based on
“consent,” its memorandum suggests in the alternative that a daily log-on banner or in-
advance computer-use agreement renders computer surveillance with EINSTEIN 2.0
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., id. at *18 (“[R]easonableness analysis
requires balancing the ‘invasion of the employees’ legitimate expectation of privacy against
the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.’
... [See United States v. Knights], 534 U.S. [112,] 118-19 [(2001)] (reasonableness inquiry
balances, ‘on the one hand, the degree to which [a search] intrudes upon an individual’s
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which a search is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests’) .... Based upon the information available to us, we believe
that EINSTEIN 2.0 operations are reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.”).
65. See 375 F.3d 679 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1112 (2005);
Einstein, supra note 38, at *10 (“[T]he federal courts of appeals have held that the use of log-
on banners or computer-user agreements ... can eliminate any legitimate expectation of
privacy in the content of Internet communications made at work using Government-owned
information systems. For example, in United States v. Simons, the computer-use policy ...
expressly noted that [the employer] would audit, inspect, and/or monitor employees’ use of the
Internet, including all file transfers, all websites visited and all e-mail messages, as deemed
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The discussion in Part II, however, suggests that the daily log-on
agreement and the in-advance computer-use agreement should not
be treated in this sort of undifferentiated fashion. An individual who
affirmatively agrees each day, upon signing in, to a prominent, clear
statement about computer monitoring undertaken by the employer
will not typically face the type of uncertainty that Part II suggested
may underlie Weinberger’s and other cases’ eschewing of consent
reasoning under the Fourth Amendment. At the Department of
Justice itself, signing in to one’s computer requires one to give ex-
press agreement to a daily log-on banner containing the following
language (which is used in the Department of Justice’s memoran-
dum to illustrate acceptable log-on banner language):
By using this information system, you understand and consent
to the following:
• You have no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
any communications transmitted through or data stored
on this information system.
• At any time, the Government may monitor, intercept, 
search and/or seize data transiting or stored on this
information system.
• Any communications transmitted through or data stored
on this information system may be disclosed or used for
any U.S. Government-authorized purpose.
[click button: I AGREE]66
appropriate. The Fourth Circuit held that this policy placed employees on notice that they
could not reasonably expect that their Internet activity would be private .... The Eighth
Circuit came to the same conclusion in United States v. Thorn. In Thorn, a state employee had
acknowledged in writing a computer-use policy, which warned that employees do not have any
personal privacy rights regarding their use of [the agency’s] information systems and
technology.... As a result of this policy, the court held that the state employee did not have any
legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the use and contents of his [work] computer,
because under the agency’s policy, employees have no personal right of privacy with respect
to their use of the agency’s computers.” (third and fourth alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)); id. at *11 (“[T]he model log-on banner and computer-
user agreement [discussed in Einstein] ... are at least as robust as—and we think they are
even stronger than—the materials that eliminated an employee’s legitimate expectation of
privacy in the content of Internet communications in Simons [and] Thorn.”).
66. Einstein, supra note 38, at *6 n.5 (emphasis added).
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Consent via one-time, in-advance agreement to a general computer-
use policy authorizing whatever type of computer surveillance an
employer might, at some point in the future, choose to undertake (or
not undertake), however, differs from the contemporaneous and
definite form of agreement associated with a daily log-on banner.
(To be sure, a widely publicized employer practice of not engaging
in the monitoring specified by a daily log-on banner could start to
undercut the distinction drawn here between a daily log-on banner
and a general in-advance computer-use policy—a point to which
Part IV returns.) The Department of Justice’s discussion in its
EINSTEIN memorandum would cohere far better with the prece-
dent and analysis discussed in this Article if the discussion dif-
ferentiated between contemporaneous agreement to specific forms
of computer surveillance presently in use, on the one hand, and in-
advance agreement to unspecified and indefinite future monitoring,
on the other.
The very fact that daily log-on banners are so easily available to
employers in a practical sense underlines how little is lost, from the
perspective of the government’s interests, in rejecting the approach
taken in the Simons case. The same conclusion holds true with
respect to surveillance of pagers—the subject of the Supreme
Court’s 2010 decision in City of Ontario v. Quon.67
The Department of Justice’s Quon Brief
The dispute in Quon arose from a government employer’s review
of communications sent over text-messaging pagers the employer
had issued to its employees.68 In arguing that the employees could
have no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in communications sent
over the pagers—a position that was not adopted by the Supreme
Court in its eventual decision69—the Department of Justice’s brief
in Quon toggled back and forth between the daily log-on banners
used by, among others, the Department itself and the highly general
“catch-all” computer-use policy used by the employer in Quon.70 As
67. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
68. Id. at 2624.
69. Id. at 2629-30.
70. See Brief for the United States at 9, 11-13, 21, Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (No. 08-1332)
(“reasonable expectation of privacy” test); infra note 72 and accompanying text (discussion of
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in its EINSTEIN 2.0 Memorandum, the Department of Justice
suggested in its Quon brief—wrongly in the view of this Article—
that in-advance and contemporaneous agreement may be treated in
an aggregate fashion.
The Department of Justice’s argument in its Quon brief began
with the general principle that “[w]hen a government employer
gives its employee access to a device or facility, but explicitly re-
serves its own right of access, the employee has no reasonable
expectation of a right” against employer surveillance of that device
or facility.71 Following the opening section featuring this statement,
the brief, in the next stage of the Department of Justice’s  argument,
referred in immediate succession to the Simons case and its progeny
(including the Thorn case noted above) and to “electronic banner[s]
or splash screen[s] that warn[ ] the user each time he log[s] on to the
computer system that his computer use [i]s subject to monitoring.”72
This fusing of the two distinct forms of agreement is especially
striking on the specific facts in Quon because the written computer-
use policy in the case did not so much as mention pagers, which
were not yet in use among members of the employer’s staff when the
policy was formulated.73 The computer-use policy by its terms
simply reserved the employer’s right “to monitor and log all network
activity including e-mail and Internet use”;74 the employer’s argu-
ment that pagers were covered was based on statements by the
individual charged with administering the pagers that messages
sent on the pagers were “considered e-mail messages” and, thus,
were subject to monitoring.75 Unquestionably, a daily “pager
banner” would have done much more than a general policy that in
its formal statement did not even mention pagers to generate a
reliable inference of lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy on
the part of the employees in Quon.76
log-on banners and general computer-use policies in Brief for the United States). 
71. Brief for the United States, supra note 70, at 12.
72. Id. at 16-17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. In the case of the pagers at issue in Quon, a log-on banner could have taken the form
of a message that would have displayed upon removing the pager from being recharged and
that would have had to be accepted through a click by the user in order for the pager to be
operational.
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IV
Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring is a rapidly growing
form of surveillance.77 What might the contemporaneous agreement
favored in this Article over an in-advance agreement look like in the
GPS monitoring context?
The log-on banners discussed above provide a ready analogy. If a
government employer wished to engage in GPS monitoring of an
employee’s vehicle location during work hours and proposed to rely
on employee agreement to avoid any potential Fourth Amendment
challenge to such monitoring, the employer could include a daily log-
on requirement before a GPS would activate. (The GPS being acti-
vated could be part of the employee’s being “clocked in” for work.) By
analogy to the discussion above, such a log-on requirement would be
on far surer ground than an in-advance agreement at the start of
employment to any GPS or other vehicle monitoring the employer
might or might not decide to undertake in the future. At the same
time, in using such a daily GPS log-on requirement, government
would be preserving its ability to utilize the tool of agreement in
managing its workplace. 
Consider what would happen if, instead, even such a daily log-on
requirement were found to be insufficient—most likely on grounds
of voluntariness78—for a finding of “consent” under the Fourth
Amendment. Although such a legal outcome might be either good or
bad on balance—a normative question not addressed in this Article
—such a result would produce a very significant impact on govern-
ment operations. By contrast, targeting only in-advance agreement
would, as a descriptive matter, impose far more modest costs on the
structure of the government workplace.
It remains to consider an important potential limit on the daily
log-on approach. If a government employer used a daily log-on
approach in connection with its GPS monitoring, or in one of the
other contexts discussed above, but at the same time let it become
universally known that in fact it never monitored vehicles’ where-
abouts in any way—or computer or pager use, as the case might
77. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
78. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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be—then the daily agreement would arguably start to be character-
ized by the same type of uncertainty as that which exists under an
in-advance agreement. In the terminology of express versus implied
agreement, the employer’s publicization of its total lack of monitor-
ing activity could cause the express daily agreement to be sup-
planted with a new implied in-advance agreement under which
monitoring—as in Simons—might or might not occur at some point
down the road; indeed, the implied in-advance agreement could even
be one under which monitoring was not allowed at all. As noted
above, however, the focus of this Article is on express agreement—a
context that does not present the many additional interpretive and
other complexities that arise with implied agreement. (To give just
one example, with implied agreement in the workplace setting it
often becomes necessary to determine whether a particular sup-
ervisory employee had authority to bind the employer to an implied
agreement; if, for instance, a supervisory employee conspicuously
and routinely avoids entering subordinates’ offices under any
circumstances, asserting that offices are “private” and should never
be entered by anyone but their rightful occupants, then is the
employer bound by such an understanding?) Focusing in the first
instance on express agreement allows one to bracket such further
complexities and, it is hoped, permits the emergence of a clear
understanding of the important distinction between in-advance and
contemporaneous agreement. However, with the inexorable pro-
gression from the GPS technology at issue in United States v.
Jones79 to technologies—such as facial recognition software—that
allow tracking of individuals without their use of any sort of medi-
ating device or tangible object (to which an express agreement
might be attached),80 the importance of implied agreement is likely
to grow with time and, accordingly, presents a compelling subject for
future work on the role of agreement under the Fourth Amendment.
79. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
80. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 409 (2012)
(“[F]ocusing on the physical placement of the GPS device ignores the growing body of tracking
technologies that make no contact with the individual.”).
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V
This Article has sought to disaggregate in-advance and contempo-
raneous express agreement, but nothing in the analysis offered here
suggests that even the latter form of agreement must necessarily be
given a dispositive role in Fourth Amendment doctrine. That such
agreement is often on surer footing than in-advance agreement
should not be mistaken for the broader claim, for just as the young
and inexperienced friend of the defendant in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte apparently gave his contemporaneous agreement to a
police search because he feared what would happen to him if he
refused,81 government employees may give contemporaneous agree-
ment automatically and largely involuntarily out of a fear for their
livelihoods in the event of a refusal.82 This Article’s hope, however,
is that understanding the special, additional limitations that attach
to in-advance agreement will allow for more considered analysis of
in-advance agreement’s proper role in Fourth Amendment analysis.
81. Appendix E: Excerpts from Reporter’s Transcript at 32, 37-39, Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732) (individual who gave his agreement to the
challenged police search was about twenty years of age at the time of the agreement); Tracey
Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39
MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 28 (2008) (observing that “a police ‘request’ to search a bag or
automobile is understood by most persons as a ‘command’” rather than an inquiry that leaves
its recipient free to do as the recipient pleases).
82. Indeed, it is intriguing to note that none of the leading Fourth Amendment workplace
drug testing cases has seemed to involve contemporaneous agreement. The distinctively
personal nature of drug testing—in which the employee performs “an excretory function
traditionally shielded by great privacy” in the presence of an employer monitor, Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)—may make salient the normative limitations
on even contemporaneous agreement. 
